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INTRODUCTION
Few areas of legal practice command more popular attention than 
criminal law.1  Yet, the manner in which criminal law is taught in law 
schools has relatively little to do with preparing students for criminal 
practice.  Beginning in the 1930s, law schools intentionally reconfigured 
their criminal law courses so that students would not become criminal 
lawyers.  The “honors” of criminal law practice, it was believed, were 
“frequently on the dubious side,” not fitting for law students interested in a 
respectable career and a superior “social position.”2
The first law school to move away from training criminal lawyers 
was Columbia.3  Spurred by a sharp “decline in employment” at private 
law firms during the Great Depression, Columbia administrators modified 
their criminal law offering, hoping to use the class as a means of preparing 
students not for criminal practice but for the “phenomenal increase in 
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1
 One need only reference a small sampling of the number of television shows dedicated 
to criminal law.  See, e.g., Law & Order, Law & Order Special Victims Unit, Boston 
Legal, Shark, and JAG, to name a few.  
2
 George W. Stumberg, Book Review, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 1123 (1941)(reviewing JEROME 
MICHAEL & HERBERT WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION (1940)); 
ARTHUR L. WOOD, THE CRIMINAL LAWYER 39-40 (1967).  
3
 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., A HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW: COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 325 
(1955). 
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governmental functions,” and rapidly increasing “demand for competent 
lawyers” in Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal.4
Though the New Deal ended in 1939, the casebook that came out 
of Columbia’s criminal law course went on to revolutionize criminal law 
teaching in the United States.  Co-authored by Columbia Law Professors 
Herbert Wechsler and Jerome Michael, Criminal Law and its 
Administration became the first law school casebook to successfully 
synthesize social science materials with cases, inspiring a generation of 
criminal law teachers to organize their courses along similar lines.5
Sanford H. Kadish, to take just one influential example, modeled his 1962 
Criminal Law & Its Processes after Wechsler, spawning a wave of similar 
texts in the 1960s and 1970s.6  As late as May 2008, Kadish – remaining 
4
 GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 325.  A similar phenomenon happened at Yale.  See LAURA 
KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, 182 (1986) [hereinafter KALMAN,
REALISM].  
5
 According to Laura Kalman, Wechsler and Michael’s Criminal Law and Its 
Administration was the first casebook that successfully “integrated law with the social 
sciences.” KALMAN, REALISM, supra note 4, at 90.  Earlier attempts had been made by 
Albert Jacobs, Karl Llewellyn, William O. Douglas, and Felix Frankfurter but, according 
to Kalman, they did not stray far from the Langdellian model. Id. at 78-79, 85-86, 88.  
Jerome Michael and Herbert Wechsler completed the first unpublished version of their 
casebook for the private use of Columbia University law students in 1935.  See Jerome 
Michael & Herbert Wechsler, Cases and Materials in Criminal Law and Its 
Administration (1935) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Arthur W. Diamond Law 
Library, Columbia University).  The formal casebook was published in 1940.  HERBERT 
WECHSLER AND JEROME MICHAEL, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION: CASES,
STATUTES, COMMENTARIES (1940) [herinafter MICHAEL & WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW].   
6
 Interview with Sanford H. Kadish, Alexander F. and May T. Morrison Professor of 
Law, Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley, in Berkeley, California (May 19, 
2008) (on file with the author).  Monrad Paulsen and Sanford Kadish credited Wechsler 
directly in their 1962 casebook: MONRAD G. PAULSEN AND SANFORD H. KADISH,
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS (1st ed. 1962).  Kadish, 
Schulhofer, and Steiker still cite to Wechsler in what is now the 8th edition of the 
casebook, SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CAROL S. STEIKER, CRIMINAL 
LAW AND ITS PROCESSES (8th ed. 2007).  Joshua Dressler credits Wechsler through 
Kadish.  See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW (4th ed. 
2004).  Other casebooks that follow the Wechsler and Michael approach include 
CYNTHIA LEE & ANGELA HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2005); 
MARKUS D. DUBBER & MARK G. KELMAN, AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW: CASES,
STATUTES, COMMENTS (2005); PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES AND 
CONTROVERSIES (2005); JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT WEISBERG, GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 2004); RICHARD J. BONNIE, ANNE M. COUGHLIN,
JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. & PETER W. LOW, CRIMINAL LAW (2nd ed. 2004); LLOYD L
WEINREB, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS (7th ed. 2003); GEORGE E.
DIX AND M. MICHAEL SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed., 2002); 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, MODERN CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS (3rd
ed. 2001). Even Rollin Perkins has conceded “the modern dominance of statutes,” and 
included extensive notes with editorial comments and citations to law reviews, see 
RONALD N. BOYCE, DONALD A. DRIPPS AND ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW AND 
PROCEDURE (9th ed. 2004).  
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true to Wechsler’s vision – asserted that his book, even in its eighth 
edition, was not designed for “training legal practitioners.”7
Taking the Depression-Era beginnings of criminal law at Columbia 
as a starting point, this article takes a closer look at the history of the 
criminal law course, using previously unexamined primary sources to 
illustrate that the class is animated by a doubly subversive aim.  Not only 
did Wechsler and Michael reorient criminal law away from the 
practitioner, but they organized it in such a manner as to undermine the 
case method itself.  Convinced that the Langdellian method had 
contributed to the Supreme Court’s destruction of early New Deal 
programs by fostering a view of the law as a “closed-system,” Michael 
and Wechsler hoped to disrupt Langdell’s legacy and open students’ eyes 
to law’s interrelationship with society, revolutionizing law teaching in the 
process.8  Whereas Langdell’s disciples simply had students read cases, 
for example, Wechsler and Michael substituted cases for outside materials 
and editorial comments, including normative questions like whether 
certain offenses were “objectionable,” whether it was ever “justifiable” to 
kill a nonviolent offenders, and whether European codes were more 
“wise” than American ones.9
That Wechsler and Michael sought to revolutionize law teaching 
by making criminal law a vehicle for challenging the case method is not a 
subject that legal historians have explored.10  Yet, its implications are 
potentially profound.  Every year, thousands of law students graduate 
thinking that they have studied criminal law using the case method, when 
they have not.  Every year, the same law students graduate thinking that 
they have been trained for criminal practice, when they have not.  At a 
time when law schools are confronting mounting pressure to increase the 
practical nature of their first year curricula, the history of criminal law 
might provide a clue into how certain courses became more theoretical, 
and whether this trend is worth reversing.11
7
 Interview by Norman Silber and Geoffrey Miller with Herbert Wechsler, Professor, 
Columbia University School of Law, in New York City, N.Y. (August 11, 1978; 
February 23, 1979; March 12 &13, 1982), [hereinafter Wechsler, Interview] 
8 Id.
9
 MICHAEL & WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 5, at 145, 201, 224.  For 
descriptions of Langdell’s method, see KALMAN, REALISM, supra note 5, at 1-26; Howard 
Schweber, Before Langdell: The Roots of American Legal Science in THE HISTORY OF 
LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: COMMENTARIES AND PRIMARY SOURCES,
VOL. II 613, 632 (Steve Sheppard, ed., 1999).  
10
 In one of the most careful studies of legal education in the United States to date, Laura 
Kalman concludes that Langdell’s “method” remained dominant despite the rise of legal 
realism.  KALMAN, REALISM, supra note 4, at 229.   
11
 WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ET AL., CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF 
TEACHING, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007). 
Reassessments of first year curricula did not begin with the Carnegie Report.  See e.g.
Jonathan D. Glater, Harvard Law Decides to Steep Students in 21st Century Issues, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 2006.  The report has appeared to fuel the debate, however, over whether 
the first year should be modified. See e.g. Dean Claudio Grossman, Address at the 
Innovations in the First Year Curriculum Conference, American University’s Washington  
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Further, recovering the hidden history of criminal law might enable 
us to better assess the status of the case method generally in American 
legal education.  For example, even a cursory comparison of the average 
Twenty-First Century criminal law casebook with Joseph Henry Beale’s 
1894 text suggests that Langdell’s method, at least in the criminal law 
context, is dead.  Though modern casebooks appear to focus on cases, few 
use more than two cases to illustrate a legal point, few require that 
students be able to distinguish between more than three cases, and none 
create the impression that learning legal rules from briefing cases is 
sufficient for mastering criminal law.12  Instead, criminal law casebooks 
push students to consider the philosophical, social, and moral implications 
of criminalization, punishment, and crime itself, transforming the class 
into what Sanford Kadish has called “almost liberal arts.”13
To further illustrate the pedagogical and political ramifications of 
Michael and Wechsler’s innovation in the criminal law course, this article 
will proceed in four parts.  Part I will return to the Langdellian case 
method, showing how Harvard Professor and Langdell protégé Joseph 
Henry Beale utilized the method in his popular 1894 criminal law 
casebook.  Part II will show how Herbert Wechsler and Jerome Michael 
reacted to “Bealeism” by reinventing the criminal law course in the 
1930s.14  Part III will discuss initial responses to Wechsler and Michael’s 
approach, showing how scholars suspicious of criminal practitioners 
embraced it.  Part IV will trace the dramatic rise of the Wechslerian 
method in American law schools from the 1940s through the 1990s, 
showing how Michael and Wechsler’s tendency to de-emphasize cases led 
to a new kind of casebook that transformed criminal law. 
I. JOSEPH HENRY BEALE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW CASE METHOD
In 1894, a young law professor named Joseph Henry Beale, Jr. 
assembled a textbook that covered the core subjects of criminal law by 
referring almost entirely to cases.15  To those who knew the author, a 
professor at Harvard Law School, this was no surprise.16  Beale was a 
College of Law (March  21, 2008); Katharine Mangan, “A Plea for Real-World Training 
in Law Schools,” CHRON. OF HIGHER ED., Jan. 19, 2007. 
12 See supra note 6. 
13
 Kadish, Interview, supra note 6.  
14
 Jerome Frank coined the term “Bealism.” See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN 
MIND 55 (1930). 
15
 JOSEPH HENRY BEALE, JR. A SELECTION OF CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES UPON 
CRIMINAL LAW (1894) [hereinafter BEALE, CASES].  For Beale’s dominance in the early 
years of the Twentieth Century, see E.W. Puttkammer, Book Review, 8. U. CHI. L. REV. 
386 (1941) (reviewing JEROME MICHAEL & HERBERT WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW & ITS 
ADMINISTRATION (1940).  
16
 WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN 
LEGAL EDUCATION 92-99 (1994).  
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“theologian of the law” who had never worked as a lawyer but was deeply 
influenced by Christopher Columbus Langdell’s theory that legal 
principles could be found, classified, and organized simply by reading 
reported cases.17
In his preface, Beale made it clear that the cases he had selected 
were “chiefly intended for the use of classes in schools,” and that in order 
for students to “get the benefit” of studying them it was necessary to 
“omit” either commentary or head notes.18  Instead, Beale made his 
students sift through relatively large numbers of cases from different 
jurisdictions to distill, as best they could, basic criminal law principles.19
He divided his casebook into twenty-two chapters, the first eleven 
covering what might be considered the general part of the criminal law, 
“the criminal act,” the “criminal intent,” “justification,” as well as 
procedural considerations like “the indictment,” “former conviction or 
acquittal,” and “criminal procedure.”20  The last eleven chapters, 
conversely, included specific offenses like larceny, embezzlement, false 
pretences, conspiracy, and nuisance.21
For each topic, no matter whether general or specific, Beale 
included anywhere from six to nine cases.  To take just one example, he 
covered the specific offense of voluntary manslaughter by assigning eight 
cases and nothing else.  The first case, drawn from England, held that 
words alone could not constitute provocation but, if words led to combat 
“betwixt two upon a sudden heat,” then any ensuing death could be 
charged as manslaughter.22  In the next case, a defendant was impressed 
into “the Majesty’s service” without a valid warrant, leading several men 
to come to his rescue, killing a police officer in the process.23  Reluctant to 
offer “encouragement” to “private men to take upon themselves to be the 
assertors of other men’s liberties” the Court held that the killing was 
murder, not manslaughter.24  In the remaining six cases, all drawn from 
English courts, students were required to actively consider different 
applications of the principle of provocation, all arising from slightly 
different factual scenarios, including throwing a pickpocket into an 
17 Id.  Felix Frankfurter referred to Beale, one of his old professors, as a “theologian of 
the law.”  Felix Frankfurter, Joseph Henry Beale, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 701, 702 (1943).  See 
also STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO 
POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 92-96 (2000).  
18
 BEALE, CASES supra note 15, at Preface (no page delineated).  
19
 Beale praised Langdell’s pedagogical approach in an article written for the New York 
University Law Quarterly Review in 1931.  See Joseph H. Beale, Langdell, Gray, Thayer 
and Ames: Their Contribution to the Study and Teaching of Law 8 N.Y.U. L. Q. R. 385 
(1931)[hereinafter Beale, Langdell].   
20
 BEALE, CASES supra note 15, at vii.  
21 Id.
22 Id. at 473. 
23 Id. at 474.  
24 Id.
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“adjoining pond,” stabbing a woman in the back after she delivered a “box 
on the ear” and killing a constable in response to an “illegal” arrest.25
In none of the scenarios did Beale provide any commentary or 
outside sources.  Nor did he mention any statute.  Instead, he presented the 
students with cases that collectively illustrated classic common law 
examples of provocation, meanwhile providing some sense of the limits of 
those rules.  From a pedagogical perspective, the section provided students 
with an active opportunity to learn legal rules by deriving them from 
factual scenarios, without getting into a critical discussion of why those 
rules existed. 
Even when Beale did include non-case materials, they invariably 
constituted ruminations on what the common law was, not what it should 
be.  Perhaps foremost among his outside sources was William Hawkins’s 
A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown.26 Hawkins’s Treatise did not 
encourage students to think critically about whether the common law 
should be changed, but sought simply to illustrate what it said.  For 
example, Beale introduced the crime of murder by including an excerpt 
from Hawkins explaining the evolution of the offense from one that 
initially punished towns for failing to produce the killer of a “Dane,” to a 
general crime applicable to anyone who killed an “Englishman” with 
“malice prepense.”27  Immediately following the excerpt, Beale included 
six cases.28
In the first case, the court held that if a constable “or any of his 
assistants” were killed during an attempt to suppress “an affray” then the 
killer was guilty of murder, whether he intended to kill the party or not.29
In the next case, the court held that even if a private citizen attempted to 
break up a domestic dispute, the accidental killing of that citizen by one of 
the disputing parties could be considered murder, provided that the killer 
had “notice” of the victim’s intent.30  For the next three cases, Beale 
presented similar situations where malice could be implied.  They 
included an instance where an employer used a “bar of iron” to discipline 
a servant; a father set fire to a house with his retarded son inside, and a 
killer shot at a man on horseback but mistakenly hit a bystander.31   By the 
final case in the series, students were well versed in the principle that 
malice could be inferred in cases where the defendant committed an 
25 Id, at 477-87. 
26 Id. at 461, citing WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN OR A 
SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPLE MATTERS RELATING TO THAT SUBJECT (1824). 
27 Id. According to Hawkins, the original crime of murder in England was enacted by 
King Canute simply to save the lives of Danes, not Englishmen.  If a Dane was killed, the 
“the town or hundred where the fact was done was to be amerced to the king.” Id.
28
 BEALE, CASES supra note 15, at 462-471. 
29 Id. at 462.  
30 Id. at 462.  
31 Id. at 463-469. 
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“intentional” deadly act without facing “impending peril to life or 
member” or some kind of legitimate “provocation.”32
To further elaborate on the differences between murder and 
manslaughter, Beale included no less than nine more cases.  Again, each 
case provided students with a relatively clear example of a legal rule.  First 
degree murder required premeditated and deliberate design.33  Second 
degree murder included provocation by words alone.34  Manslaughter 
applied when death was the result of either legitimate provocation or 
accidental killing.35
What might students have learned from such an approach?  
Clearly, they learned how to read and organize relatively large groupings 
of cases, six to nine being common to cover one particular topic, a number 
that provided students with a framework from within which to assess a 
wide range of factual scenarios.  By excluding extraneous notes and 
outside sources, Beale pushed students to learn the law much as they 
would if they were alone in a library at a law firm, going through hundreds 
of cases to determine the contours of a legal rule. 
As Beale himself remembered it, the case method marked a 
dramatic shift away from passive learning, the process of simply “hearing 
and reading the knowledge of a teacher” and towards a more active 
approach in which the student “gains” knowledge “for himself, first hand, 
from the sources.”36  Though such an approach may not be as “formally 
correct as that received from a master” noted Beale, it made a deeper 
impression on students, remained longer in their memories, even to the 
point of becoming “part of [their] mental fiber.”37  The value of the case 
method, in other words, was that it was a type of practical, active learning, 
a learning best facilitated through the assignment of relatively large 
numbers of cases for students to work through alone.38
In addition to its pedagogic value, Beale’s approach had a certain 
political aspect as well.  By presenting students with nothing but cases, 
many dating back to sixteenth and seventeenth century England, Beale 
created an image of the common law as an authoritative source of legal 
rules, something to be revered rather than reformed.  Even cases that 
begged for statutory reform, like the imputation of malice for accidental 
killings, for example, marshaled a certain respect in Beale’s universe 
simply because they derived from the common law. 
Beale’s celebration of the common law made him Langdellian.  
Like Christopher Columbus Langdell, who introduced the case method to 
Harvard in 1870, Beale instilled in his students an impression of the law as 
32 Id. at 470.  
33 Id. at 472.  
34 Id. at 474.  
35 Id. at 474-487. 
36
 Beale, Langdell, supra, note 19, at 386.  
37 Id.
38
 ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO 
THE 1980S, 54-5 (1983). 
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something derived not from immutable, natural law principles, but actual, 
real world cases.39  In Langdell’s mind, students should be given the 
impression that law was a “logically coherent system of technical rules” 
that were to be learned from a positive rather than a normative 
standpoint.40  Indeed, Langdell believed strongly that the “chief business 
of a lawyer” was to “learn and administer the law as it is” not as it “ought 
to be.”41  Even judges should not be engaged in raw policy-making but 
bound by the common law rule of precedent, discouraged from exercising 
any kind of radical, reformist impulse. 
Langdell’s approach coincided nicely with a variety of prevailing 
educational, political and economic trends in the United States during the 
latter years of the Nineteenth Century.  Thanks to the Civil War, which 
brought an “abrupt and violent conclusion” to professional faith in natural 
law, Langdell’s emphasis on judicial positivism provided a welcome 
respite.42  Pedagogically, it provided a sophisticated counterpoint to the 
recitation of legal rules, the primary methodology in the earliest, most 
primitive law schools.43  It also provided an alternative to the law office 
apprenticeship, perhaps the most popular means of becoming a lawyer in 
the Nineteenth Century.44
Even more importantly, Langdell’s anti-contextual approach 
coincided nicely with the rise of the industrial revolution.  As industry 
boomed in the final years of the Nineteenth Century, the Supreme Court of 
the United States found itself in the midst of innumerable disputes over 
whether democratic majorities had the power to regulate private 
industry.45  Reluctant to impede economic growth, the Court adopted a 
formalist adherence to presumably fundamental doctrines of liberty of 
contract and due process, doctrines that it deftly used to strike down wave 
after wave of regulatory legislation.46 Whether Langdell anticipated the 
rise of this formalism or not, his decision to assign cases, and cases only, 
complemented the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence by instilling in students 
a respect for private law-ordering along with a concomitant contempt for 
legislative intervention in the business arena. 
The Court’s contempt for public law, the apotheosis of which 
emerged in Lochner v. New York in 1905, sparked dissent in the legal 
academy.47  In 1915, for example, future Supreme Court Justice Felix 
Frankfurter argued that the “growing legislative activity of our time” 
should guide law schools in revising their curricula, moving them away 
from strict adherence to the case method and toward a more normative, 
39
 FELDMAN, supra note 17 at 93; KALMAN, REALISM, supra note 4, at 10-12. 
40
 LAPIANA, supra note 16, at 78.  
41
 LAPIANA, supra note 16, at 77.  
42
 FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 86. 
43 Id. at 47.  
44 Id. at 48. 
45
 Schweber, supra note 9, at 632.  
46
 LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 472 (2001).  
47 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 4 (1905). 
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policy-oriented approach.48   Animating Frankfurter’s pleas were at least 
two factors: the need for public regulation of rapidly expanding, injury-
producing, and sometimes irresponsible private industries, coupled with 
the inability of the courts and the private bar to respond proactively to 
large-scale regulatory problems.  Noting that courts were “already 
laboring under too heavy a pressure,” and that private lawyers were 
“overworked” and too “absorbed” in resolving cases to think 
“consciously” and “systematically” about meeting the demands of a 
rapidly industrializing mass society, Frankfurter identified “teachers of the 
law” as the “natural” candidates for arriving at solutions to some of the 
Progressive era’s most tenacious legal problems.49
Frankfurter also called for the production of a new type of law 
student.  “It is not enough that young men should come from our schools 
equipped to become skillful practitioners,” he argued, “[w]e must show 
them the law as an instrument,” something that can be used “for human 
betterment” and not simply a tool in the hands of “clever pleaders.”50
Though Frankfurter did not go so far as to assert that the case method be 
abandoned, he alluded to it negatively, noting that students should no 
longer be taught that law was simply a “Procrustean bed” of precedent 
“into which all persons and all societies must inexorably be fitted.”51
Such words decried both the strict adherence to common law cases that 
Langdell and Beale advocated, as well as the type of deductive logic that 
they sought to instill in their students, a logic that, in Frankfurter’s words, 
simply applied “old ideas to new facts.”52  Instead, Frankfurter called for 
“new premises to fit present needs,” and an inductive approach to solving 
legal problems by “assimilating social and economic facts” to cast light on 
“new conditions.”53  These were progressive words, both in the sense that 
they sought to link legal education to the larger goals of socially-conscious 
Progressive-Era reformers, and also in the manner that they questioned 
strict adherence to the Langdellian case method as sufficient preparation 
for legal practice. 
Others agreed.  In 1923 Columbia Law School Dean Harlan Fiske 
Stone declared that while the case method was helpful in negotiating “the 
jungle of judicial decisions,” law professors should not approach legal 
teaching as simply “a hermetically sealed compartment.”54   Instead, they 
should look to the “social and economic forces” which gave law its “form 
and substance.”55  No historical event brought this lesson home more 
poignantly than the Great Depression.  Sparked by a stock market crash in 
48
 Felix Frankfurter, The Law and the Law Schools, 1 A. B. A. J. 532 (1915). 
49 Id. at 533. 
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54
 Harlan Fiske Stone, Some Phases of Legal Education in America, 58 AM. L. REV. 747 
(1923). 
55 Id.
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1929, the Depression led to massive disruptions in employment, 
productivity, and consumer confidence, pushing national leaders like 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt to develop public law solutions to what seemed 
a massive, nation-threatening, private sector debacle. 
Interestingly, the nation’s plunge into economic depression 
following the crash of 1929 had an unexpected impact on law school 
curricula, particularly course offerings at elite New England schools 
accustomed to preparing graduates for corporate practice.56  As Columbia 
University law professor Julius Goebel remembered it, the “decline of 
employment by law offices due to the rigors of the Great Depression,” 
coupled with the “phenomenal increase in governmental functions” during 
the New Deal, made it “urgent” that the school begin to train students in 
“public law.”57  This need led Columbia to hire a promising young 
graduate and former Goebel research fellow named Herbert Wechsler, a 
proponent of the New Deal who would come to have a remarkable impact 
on the teaching of criminal law. 
II. WECHSLER & MICHAEL RESPOND TO BEALE
Herbert Wechsler, who graduated from Columbia in 1931 in the 
midst of a Depression-ravaged job market, brought with him his own 
reasons for upsetting the case method.  Like many young scholars at the 
time, Wechsler believed that the Great Depression had been caused by 
problems inherent to laissez faire economics, not least of them 
unregulated banking, an un-policed stock exchange, and an over-
confidence in market forces that collectively made a mockery of the 
formalist premise that economic affairs were best managed through the 
private adjudication of legal disputes.  The case method, which focused on 
judicial adjudication and therefore perpetuated what Roscoe Pound called 
the common law’s “antipathy to legislation,” denigrated state regulation as 
a lesser form of lawmaking – if not an outright intrusion into fundamental 
rights of property and contract.58  As law’s old guard clung to Langdell in 
the midst of the howling 1930s, Wechsler began to view the case method 
as limiting, even dangerous.  Not surprisingly, he turned to earlier thinkers 
who had long called for curricular reform, law teachers like Felix 
Frankfurter among them.59
56
 GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 325.  
57 Id., at 315, 325.  
58
 Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract 18 YALE L. J. 454, 462 (1909). 
59
 See e.g., Frankfurter, Law Schools, supra note 48. Interestingly, Wechsler’s 
relationship with Frankfurter lent more than just intellectual support to his decision to 
break from the case method and produce a different type of lawyer.  Thanks to 
connections that he had with the Roosevelt administration, Frankfurter became a “one-
man employment agency” for recent law graduates interested in working for federal New 
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To Herbert Wechsler and his senior colleague Jerome Michael, 
Frankfurter provided theoretical ammunition for fighting the nation’s 
frightening plunge into economic recession, a recession accelerated by 
doctrinal formalism.  Frankfurter’s conviction that students should be 
taught that law is “an instrument” to be used for “human betterment” 
impressed them; as did Frankfurter’s support for President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal.60  Both Wechsler and Michael proudly 
endorsed Roosevelt, standing out as two of only five “New Dealers” on 
Columbia’s law faculty at the time.61   When the Supreme Court began 
striking down New Deal programs like the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration and the National Industrial Recovery Act on what they 
believed were overtly formalist, “closed system” grounds, both Wechsler 
and Michael placed at least some blame at the feet of the case method for 
producing an isolated, politically unresponsive judiciary.62  As Wechsler 
later remembered it, the Court possessed no “receptivity to statutory 
changes of the common law,” lacked any “sympathetic treatment of 
administrative agencies,” and clung desperately to the notion of the 
common law as a “closed system,” a position that deserved “unqualified 
disdain.”63
Rather than view law as a closed system, Wechsler came to view it 
in more “utilitarian” terms, an instrument of “statecraft” that could be used 
to pull the country out of its fiscal woes.64  Before this could happen, 
however, lawyers and law students needed to learn to think about the law 
differently; as a tool for change and not a prophylactic to state intervention 
and control.65  Wechsler distilled these notions into four separate “articles 
of faith” that guided his legal career.66  They included: 1) a rejection of the 
common law as a “closed system,” 2) an emphasis on “judicial receptivity 
to statutory changes of the common law,” 3) a presumption that “legal 
understanding is imperfectly obtained” and, 4) an “unqualified disdain” 
for the Supreme Court’s formalist destruction of New Deal programs 
“despite the magnitude of the abuse and dislocation incident to the 
development of an industrial society.”67
Wechsler let his “articles of faith” guide his selection of materials 
for teaching criminal law.  Not offered at Columbia prior to Wechsler’s 
arrival on the faculty in 1931, criminal law had been virtually ignored due 
to the fact that it was “generally thought to have no money in it” and was 
conservative, Roscoe Pound also called for curricular reform.  Roscoe Pound, Liberty of 
Contract 18 YALE L. J. 454 (1908-1909), 470. 
60
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therefore “not interesting” to most “bread-and-butter” students.68
Precisely for this reason, Wechsler saw teaching the course as an 
“opportunity” for him to put his philosophical and political assumptions 
into practice.69
Frustrated with what he perceived to be a disconnect between 
law’s political underpinnings and the apolitical nature of the case method, 
Wechsler joined his colleague Jerome Michael in putting together a 
different kind of criminal law casebook in 1934.  In thinking about what to 
include, Wechsler later remembered that he sought to assemble 
“pedagogical materials” that “invited cogitation outside the closed 
system.”70  The “closed system” in his opinion, was what Langdell 
advanced, namely a notion that the “whole process of learning, 
understanding, [and] applying the law was a process of uncovering the 
leading cases” and through a process of “logical deduction” applying them 
to “new situations.”71  To Wechsler, such a “closed” method had 
contributed to the Supreme Court’s early, anti-New Deal stance.  Instead 
of focusing on the “closed system” of the common law then, which 
provided “no room for legislative or quasi-legislative judgment,” 
Wechsler turned instead to a much more open system of legal pedagogy, 
one that incorporated a variety of materials and posed a variety of 
questions.72  Intent on getting students to think about legislation as an 
important mode of legal action, Wechsler assembled his casebook so as 
not to simply require that students “distill the law” from reading cases, but 
rather ponder “interesting questions” like: “what are the consequences of 
this or the other type of formulation or norm?” “How can we find out 
something about consequences?” And “how can we face up candidly to 
value choices?”73  Such questions, believed Wechsler, constituted a 
“wholly different way of thinking about the law” than the earlier 
“Langdellian way.”74
To provide a taste of Wechsler’s approach, it is helpful to compare 
his casebook’s section on voluntary manslaughter with that of Joseph 
Henry Beale.  Unlike Beale, who assigned a total of eight full cases for 
students to read on the subject, Wechsler assigned one.  The case, Regina 
v. Welsh, was one that Beale had included in his casebook and originated 
from England in 1869.  It involved a defendant who had taken his future 
victim to court for reclamation of a debt only to find the claim repudiated 
by a judge.75  Angry over his defeat, the defendant went to a “public 
house” or bar, where he met his future victim, who ridiculed him for 
68 Id.
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failing to secure the debt.76  Enraged, the defendant approached the victim 
(who put up his hand in defense), and then stabbed him with a “clasp 
knife,” killing him on the spot.77  Desperate to have his charge of murder 
reduced to manslaughter, the defendant tried to claim that he acted “under 
the influence of passion,” only to have the court rule that provocation must 
be such as would excite “the mind of a reasonable man” and that “mere 
words” did not suffice, nor did “putting” out one’s hand in defense, as the 
victim seemed to do when the defendant approached him.78
For Beale, that was all that students needed to know.79  Compared 
to the case where the defendant had actually been in combat, Welsh did 
not constitute grounds for provocation, nor could it be synthesized with 
the case where the defendant was pick-pocketed and threw his thief into an 
“adjoining pond,” gaining the provocation defense.80  If anything, Welsh
bore distinct similarities to the defendant who had stabbed a woman in the 
back for boxing him on the ear.81
Such doctrinal distinctions formed only a small part of Wechsler’s 
analysis.  Throughout the case he included footnotes that referred to law 
review articles and commission reports, even describing the evolution of 
the doctrine in the United States over the course of the Nineteenth and 
early Twentieth Centuries.82  Immediately following the case, Wechsler 
included a series of “Notes” that included brief summaries of several cases 
along with North Dakota’s statutory prohibition against infanticide, an 
excerpt from Bentham’s “Theory of Legislation,” an excerpt from 
Holmes’s “Common Law,” and a statute from India. 
What might students have learned from such materials?  The brief 
notes on cases were probably designed to perform a function similar to 
Beale’s full cases.  Each one presented a slightly different factual take on 
the provocation rule, including a defendant whose girlfriend had confessed 
to having had an affair, a defendant who hit a neighbor’s wife with an axe 
after a dispute over a property line, and a defendant who shot a police 
officer in order to resist an unlawful arrest.83  The other materials, 
however, particularly the excerpts from Bentham and Holmes, aimed at a 
different target.  Bentham’s selection, for example, argued that 
punishments should not be reduced for cases where passions were high, 
but rather should be increased to “exceed the advantage of the offence.”84
Precisely because people were more prone to commit offenses while under 
“the heat of passion,” in other words, the punishment should be “even 
more an object of dread” than in cases where the defendant was operating 
76 Id.
77 Id.
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rationally.85  Clearly such a proposition invited debate over the value of 
the provocation defense, including why it should be allowed at all.  This 
was something that Beale’s text did not do.  Nor did Beale cite Holmes, 
who noted that if the “object of punishment is prevention” then 
punishments should be more severe in cases of “great excitement.”86  At 
least twice, in other words, Wechsler included materials that tested the 
wisdom behind the common law rule, in addition to requiring students to 
learn the rule.  Following his case notes, for example, Wechsler provided 
discussion questions that included queries like: “Do you agree with 
Bentham?” and “What justification is there for making criminal homicides 
which are provoked?”87
If nothing else, here was a relatively dramatic shift away from the 
pedagogical theory originally envisioned by either Beale or Langdell.  
Though Wechsler and Michael incorporated cases into their text, for 
example, at least half of their materials were designed not to drive home 
the basic principles of the common law, so much as to engender debate 
about what that law, ultimately, should be.  From one perspective, such an 
approach might be viewed as a type of refutation of the common law, an 
approach to teaching which presumed that the law could be changed and 
should be changed based not on deducing eternal principles from past 
cases but rather thinking critically about the law’s function in every day 
life.  This type of legal education aimed to create a very different type of 
lawyer, if you will, than Langdell’s method.  Instead of an attorney who 
revered the presumably timeless principles of the common law, or even 
one who simply limited their professional goals to the representation of 
clients, Wechsler and Michael’s method favored, if not presumed that 
students would become active players in the legislative process.  In certain 
ways, Wechsler was preparing students to become enlightened leaders 
whose knowledge of the law would carry directly into public service. 
III. EARLY REACTIONS TO THE CASEBOOK
Wechsler and Michael’s casebook did not go unnoticed.  In 1941, 
University of Texas law professor George Wilfred Stumberg reviewed the 
work, commending the two Columbia law professors for doing more than 
simply updating Beale.  In Stumberg’s opinion, Michael and Wechsler had 
raised “a timely question” as to the “purposes that can and should be 
served by American law schools in giving a course in criminal law.”88
85 Id.
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Noting that “relatively few law-school graduates practice criminal law” 
Stumberg downplayed the need for instilling “technical knowledge” about 
the criminal process.89  In fact, he even went so far as to argue that the 
“ambitious law graduate” should not be “blamed for shunning the criminal 
courts” a “not very nice” place where success hinged more on being 
“sharp-witted” than “learned.”90
Convinced that law schools would be better off dropping criminal law 
than offering a course on the nuts and bolts of practice, Stumberg 
maintained that the course should be used to fulfill “greater obligations.”91
Such obligations, in his opinion, included training students to think about 
the “long range social considerations” of criminal law policy, not to 
mention the contributions of “criminologists” and “psychiatrists” to 
understanding why crime occurred and how law might be used to control 
it.92  Unimpressed by criminal practitioners, who Stumberg believed were 
“preoccupied with their day to day tasks” and limited in their 
understanding of “positive law,” the Texas professor approved Michael 
and Wechsler’s attempt to go beneath the “surface” and make students 
think critically about the “law in action.”93
It was a remarkable review, not only for its overwhelming support of 
Wechsler and Michael’s text, but for the insight that it cast on the 
pedagogical and professional context of teaching criminal law at the time.  
For example, Stumberg made it relatively clear that the practice of 
criminal law was not something that most law students in Texas aspired to 
do, nor was it something that they should aspire to do.  Indeed, he seemed 
to desire that criminal law teachers not even try to encourage their students 
to go into criminal law, something that was a poor choice for “bright 
young” men “with an eye to profit and social position.”94  Whether 
Stumberg worried that criminal lawyers would not match the alumni 
contributions of students who entered “offices whose clients do not carry 
even the slightest scent of the jail” is uncertain, yet he clearly did not see 
criminal practice to be a worthy occupation for University of Texas 
graduates.95
Interestingly, just as Stumberg seemed adamant about discouraging 
students from criminal practice, so too did he express enthusiasm for using 
criminal law as a vehicle for getting them to think like policy makers.96
Evidence of this emerged in Stumberg’s closing paragraph where he 
praised Wechsler and Michael for transforming criminal law into a method 
for encouraging students to engage in “social thinking” not personal 
89
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“interest.”97  “If this emphasis on [social thinking] is unsound,” he noted, 
for example, then “the shouting of these last years about ‘social 
engineering’ has been unsound.”98  What Stumberg meant by “shouting” 
about social engineering was not clear.  It is possible that he was referring 
to the work of social scientists like Thorstein Veblen, who posited that 
governmental institutions could, with the help of scientific means, be used 
to alter mass behavior.99  Yet, Veblen had begun publishing such ideas as 
early as 1919, long before Wechsler’s casebook.100  What did the recent 
“shouting” refer to?  One possibility is that Stumberg was responding to a 
surge of scholarly interest in the late 1930s focusing on the manner in 
which mass culture and governmental institutions could change social 
behavior, including criminal behavior, on a mass level.  Much of this 
thinking came out of Germany’s Frankfurt School, an institution founded 
by scholars like Theodore Adorno, Leo Lowenthal, and Max Horkheimer 
in the 1920s.101  To them, mass culture created a variety of opportunities 
for influencing large numbers of people, not always for the better.102
Adorno, for example, studied the manner in which popular culture led to 
the creation of something he called the “authoritarian personality” a theory 
that drew inspiration from the rise of the National Socialist Party in 
Germany in the 1930s.103  Indeed by the time the Nazis seized power in 
Germany in 1933, much of the Frankfurt School had fled to the U.S., 
many ending up at the Institute for Social Research at Columbia 
University.104
One member of the Frankfurt school who ended up at Columbia and 
became interested in criminal law pedagogy was Otto Kirchheimer.  
Kirchheimer, who focused on penal institutions, spent time at Columbia 
rewriting George Rusche’s Punishment and Social Structure, a pioneering 
text examining the roles that prisons played in modern society, not simply 
as penal institutions but buttresses to the class structure.105  In his own 
work, Kirchheimer explored tensions between pragmatic and theoretical 
approaches to sentencing, as well as the possibilities of using prison for 
rehabilitative ends.  In a testament to his influence, Wechsler and Michael 
cited Kirchheimer twice in their casebook, once to support the notion that 
retribution might be justified “unless the retributive purpose is deemed to 
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be authoritative,” a classic Frankfurt School theme, and also to suggest 
that prisons were rarely reformative institutions.106
Though it is unlikely that Wechsler or Michael saw themselves as critical 
theorists of the Frankfurt School variety, their citations to Kirchheimer 
suggest that they were aware of the School’s critical work.  In fact, 
Kirchheimer himself gave Wechsler a remarkably positive review in 
1941.107  Noting that criminal law could be structured in at least two ways, 
either as a course in how to “draw the boundary line” between criminal 
and non-criminal conduct, or as a “broader” inquiry involving the 
“integration of law and social science,” Kirchheimer praised Michael and 
Wechsler for pursuing the latter.108  In particular, Kirchheimer lauded 
Michael and Wechsler’s inclusion of “extra-legal” material, or readings 
that fleshed out the “political and social conditions under which rules arise 
and are constantly reshaped.”109  Such an approach, he argued, represented 
nothing less than a “pioneering work” in the “art” of teaching criminal 
law.110
Not all scholars agreed.  To Chicago Law Professor and Beale successor 
E. W. Puttkammer, the “enormous” amount of “nonlegal” material that 
Wechsler and Michael cited made their casebook “as much of a reference 
work” as a “teaching tool.”111  In fact, Puttkammer even lamented that 
Wechsler and Michael had not published the casebook as a reference text, 
noting that it was “almost appalling by its sheer length” and a better fit for 
the reference “category.”112  Others who doubted the wisdom of 
incorporating social science materials to the extent that Wechsler and 
Michael did included legal giant and one-time reformer Roscoe Pound.  
“[C]riminology and penal methods should be put in graduate courses for 
teachers and administrative officials,” wrote Pound, not courses aimed at 
law students who have “more than enough to do in learning the lawyer’s 
technique.” 113  “The need,” that law schools faced, continued Pound in a 
conservative mood, was not to train administrators but “to give competent 
fundamental training in criminal law to those who are to take part as 
counsel, prosecutors and judges.”114  Taking “part” as counselors and 
judges meant training practitioners, not the kind of federal administrative 
attorneys that Herbert Wechsler had in mind.  Indeed, Pound seemed to 
think that Wechsler’s type of training would actually harm “first-year law 
106
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students” by instilling in them “wrong ideas” about criminal practice that 
would be difficult to “dislodge,” ultimately compromising “the 
administration of justice.”115
Pound’s concern for the administration of justice, coupled with his 
reluctance to push too far in the social science direction, came from at 
least two sources.  One, interestingly, was the rise of Stalinism in Russia, a 
political development that led him to fear that abandoning the case method 
might actually increase the chances of America becoming an authoritarian 
state.116  Just as Herbert Wechsler believed that the case method fostered 
private-minded attorneys who prized private, laissez-faire ordering over 
public law, Pound came to believe the opposite: abandoning the case 
method risked creating statist attorneys who ignored private interests in 
favor of big government.  “In the Soviet polity,” noted Pound in 1952, 
“punitive justice has been substantially taken away from the courts and 
made a matter of administrative action.”117  Something similar, he 
believed, could happen in the United States, particularly if “advocates, 
prosecutors, and judges are not well trained in the law.”118  Implying that 
students who learned from Wechsler and Michael’s approach were not 
“well trained in the law,” Pound went on to argue that students not 
inculcated in the common law tradition “may well turn us from the 
traditional judicial path of the common law into the administrative 
path.”119  Such a development, feared Pound, would place the United 
States “on the road to absolute government.”120
Pound’s comments suggest, remarkably, that Stalinism raised questions 
about American legal education.121  Of course, neither Herbert Wechsler 
nor Jerome Michael were Stalinists, nor did they believe that abandoning 
the common law would lead to authoritarianism.  Yet, Pound’s fear that 
their emphasis on administration detracted from the common law’s 
traditional aversion to statism was not completely unreasonable.  As 
outlandish as Pound’s concerns seemed, even Wechsler and Michael 
would probably have agreed that America’s adherence to the common law 
had empowered the private sector, making it capable not only of 
withstanding state intrusion but, as the destruction of the First New Deal 
suggested, overcoming it.  The very same factors that made Wechsler and 
Michael New Dealers, in other words, also subjected them to charges of 
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being unwitting supporters of a tendency towards the kind of 
authoritarianism emerging in the U.S.S.R, Eastern Europe, and China. 
Whether Pound thought that Wechsler and Michael were proto-
authoritarians or not, he had at least one other reason for lobbying against 
Wechsler and Michael’s approach to teaching criminal law.  Like 
Columbia’s administrators in the 1930s, he too recognized that “economic 
causes” had led “leaders of the [legal] profession” to look down on careers 
spent in the “criminal courts.”122 Pound also realized that “no ambitious 
student in a national law school” would actively seek “practice in criminal 
cases.” 123  Yet, this left the question open as to students who were not 
enrolled in national schools.  What were they to do?  Rather than waste 
their time questioning the common law, Pound believed that students at 
less prestigious regional schools should learn how to practice.124  He made 
this apparent by agreeing to write an introduction for a casebook 
assembled by University of California Los Angeles Law Professor Rollin 
M. Perkins in 1952.125
Perkins declared an open concern for the practitioner in his 
Preface, rejecting Michael and Wechsler’s approach to criminal law 
teaching on the grounds that it did not prepare students for actual 
practice.126  Blasting Michael and Wechsler for tailoring their casebook to 
students who had “other purposes” for taking criminal law than entering 
the criminal bar, Perkins made sure to note in his preface that “the first 
need of the lawyer is to know what the law is.”127  “A class made up of 
beginning law students,” he continued, “should not be conducted as if it 
were a ‘lawyer’s seminar,’” nor should professors use cases as “mere 
pegs” on which to hang “general discussions of criminology.”128
Determined not to focus on criminology – or any other type of 
social science for that matter – Perkins assembled a casebook that was 
classically Bealean.  Just as Beale presented students with large numbers 
of cases and few outside sources, Perkins did the same.  To cover the 
broad topic of homicide, he included no less than twenty-five cases and no 
subheadings.  This meant that students had to determine for themselves 
which cases applied to murder, manslaughter, negligent homicide and so 
on.129
The UCLA professor also ignored materials that questioned the 
common law.  Unlike Michael and Wechsler, who had students debating 
whether European codes were “wiser” than American ones, or whether 
Oliver Wendell Holmes’s theory of increasing punishment for heat-of-
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passion killings improved the common law, Perkins used outside sources 
only when he thought it necessary to illustrate black letter rules.  For 
example, to help students grasp the law of homicide he included in his 
appendix an abbreviated version of a law review article that he himself 
had written on the distinction between murder and manslaughter.130
Organized much like a legal treatise, the article presented murder, 
manslaughter, and partial defenses like provocation in relatively straight-
forward, uncritical terms.  Though the excerpt discussed the provocation 
defense, for example, it failed to ask whether defendants acting in the heat 
of passion deserved harsher penalties, as Holmes’s piece had; opting 
instead to simply classify and explain common law examples of when 
provocation applied, cases like battery, mutual combat, trespass, and 
adultery.131
Interestingly, even though Perkins adopted a much more 
conservative approach than Wechsler and Michael, he still appropriated 
what might be called a Wechslerian “look.”  Instead of simply entitling his 
book Cases on Criminal Law as Beale did, for example, Perkins used the 
more suggestive, Cases and Materials on Criminal Law, even though 
there were few “materials” to be found.132  He also downplayed the 
reactionary nature of his text, being sure to mention in his Preface that his 
casebook was not a reaction to the social science method so much as a 
move toward a “middle position” between Langdell and the social science 
approach.133   Of course, this raised an obvious question, why bother 
downplaying the text’s aversion to social science?  One possibility is that 
Perkins wanted to sell copies.  By 1952, the year Perkins’s casebook was 
published, Michael and Wechsler’s casebook was enjoying widespread 
popularity.134  In fact, the authors were considering a second edition when 
Michael died in 1953.135
Driving the popularity of Wechsler and Michael’s text was a 
convergence of forces that placed social science at the center of criminal 
law teaching in the 1950s.  Perhaps foremost among these was an 
ascendant faith in the ability of science and experts to improve almost all 
aspects of human life.136  Though faith in experts impacted law in myriad 
ways, one manifestation emerged in calls by legal academics and 
professional associations to reform criminal law, a field that had long 
suffered from academic and professional “neglect.”137  In 1951, the 
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Rockefeller Foundation granted the American Law Institute, or ALI, 
money to put toward a model penal code that would revise irrational, 
arbitrary aspects of the common law.138  Though the ALI had envisioned 
such a code before, rapid developments in “disciplines concerned with 
social aspects of behavior,” revitalized interest in the late 1940s and early 
1950s.139  Convinced that state legislatures could benefit from new 
developments in social science, the ALI hoped to make its criminal code 
available to legislatures for possible adoption by the end of the decade.140
To facilitate the MPC’s completion, the ALI asked Herbert 
Wechsler, now renowned for his criminal law casebook, to serve as the 
chief Reporter for the model penal code project.141  Long interested in 
shifting emphasis away from the courts and toward public law solutions, 
Wechsler not only took the offer but quickly applied the policy-oriented 
approach that he had developed in class to the MPC, incorporating new 
discoveries in social science, particularly psychology, to the criminal law 
context.  To take just a few examples, one initiative that Wechsler 
supported was the replacement of common law notions of malice for more 
dispassionate classifications of purpose, knowledge, and recklessness.  
Another revision that Wechsler supported was the incorporation of social 
science studies on human sexuality to decriminalize moral offenses, most 
notably adultery.142
Inspired by his work with the ALI, Wechsler began to incorporate 
model penal code materials into his teaching, using them to reinforce his 
longstanding view that cases were not enough.  In 1956, for example, 
Wechsler published a supplement to Criminal Law & Its Administration
that included ALI reports on subjects as diverse as robbery, extortion, 
theft, mistake of law, and insanity.143  Again and again, the ALI materials 
that Wechsler included presented the common law as irrational and 
outdated; a message that coincided nicely with Wechsler’s longstanding 
goal of undermining student reverence for judicial law-making, 
meanwhile casting favorable light on public law solutions.  Though the 
New Deal played no role in the development of the MPC, the Code’s 
emergence only reinforced Wechsler’s ongoing interest in awakening 
students to the world of public law. 
Interestingly, the fact that most states had begun to codify their 
criminal law long before the MPC was even envisioned did not stop 
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Wechsler from using the model code to criticize judges.144  Indeed, he 
found instances where judicial interpretations of state codes had corrupted 
the original intent of those codes, providing him with an opportunity to 
show students, again, that they needed to be critical of cases.  To take just 
one example, Wechsler focused on Pennsylvania’s codification of murder 
in 1794, showing how the crime had been intentionally separated by the 
state legislature into two degrees for the purposes of reducing the number 
of defendants given the death penalty.145  As originally envisioned by the 
statute’s drafters, defendants needed to premeditate and deliberate on their 
crime in order to be convicted of first-degree murder.146  If they did not 
plan their crime in advance but simply acted on impulse or anger, then the 
highest charge that they might face was second degree murder.147  While 
this move gained widespread attention and praise for its progressive 
approach to limiting the death penalty, common law judges quickly began 
to confuse the distinction between first and second degree, grouping 
crimes where defendants had taken only an instant to deliberate into the 
first degree category.148  For Wechsler and the ALI alike, this tendency 
warranted a substantial statutory revision, one that eliminated first degree 
murder completely.149  According to the Model Penal Code, murder could 
be charged wherever an offender killed with “purpose,” regardless of 
whether they premeditated or deliberated.150
While the drafting of the MPC provided Wechsler with an 
opportunity to bolster his innovative approach to teaching criminal law, 
the completion of the MPC in 1962 canonized it.  Suddenly, the idea of 
teaching criminal law as a common law course, without attention to public 
law solutions or policy considerations seemed completely out of step with 
real world trends.  This became even more true when New York and other 
states began substantial revisions of their criminal codes in the early 
1960s, ultimately adopting large portions of the MPC.  Though 
reactionaries like Rollin Perkins continued to feed students a steady diet of 
cases, a younger generation of criminal law teachers emerged who de-
emphasized case law just as much, if not more than Wechsler, substituting 
in their place law review articles, statistical studies, open-ended policy 
questions and, of course, the MPC. 
144
 For a history of pre-MPC codification, see Sanford H. Kadish, Codifiers of the 
Criminal Law: Wechsler’s Predecessors 78 COL. L. REV. 1098 (1978).  
145
 WECHSLER, SUPPLEMENT, supra note 134, at 167-170.  Wechsler had been interested 
in the judicial obliteration of the distinction between premeditated and non-premeditated 
murder since the 1930s.  See Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the 
Law of Homicide: I, 37 Col. L. Rev. 701, 707-708 (1937). 
146
 WECHSLER, SUPPLEMENT, supra note 134, at 167-170.   
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
 22
IV. SANFORD H. KADISH AND THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CASEBOOK
One of the first casebooks to carry the torch lit by Michael and Wechsler 
in the 1930s was a text assembled by Monrad G. Paulsen and Sanford H. 
Kadish in 1962.  Entitled Criminal Law & Its Processes, Paulsen and 
Kadish’s casebook represented, as Kadish himself remembered it, a direct 
“descendant” of Wechsler and Michael’s Criminal Law and Its 
Administration.151  In fact, both Paulsen and Kadish directly 
acknowledged “an intellectual indebtedness” to “Professor Herbert 
Wechsler of the Columbia Law School,” who in their opinion had “left an 
impress upon the teaching and thinking in the criminal law,” that in their 
opinion, was both “lasting” and “profound.”152
The link to Wechsler, at least for Kadish, began in law school.  Following 
World War II, Kadish enrolled at Columbia and took Wechsler’s criminal 
law course, a class that he remembered for being “intellectually exciting” 
in a way that “other classes were not.”153  Struck by Wechsler’s 
“utilitarian,” even “Benthamite” approach to the law, Kadish was 
particularly impressed with Wechsler’s tendency to approach the subject 
“from a legislative point of view.”154  When Monrad Paulsen approached 
Kadish with the idea of assembling a casebook in the late 1950s, Kadish 
agreed, eventually drafting the largest section of the text on substantive 
criminal law, leaving Paulsen to criminal procedure.155  Though criminal 
procedure was originally intended to dominate the book, the “tail wagged 
the dog,” as Kadish later remembered it, leaving Paulsen’s section to the 
very end; ultimately to be eliminated in subsequent editions.156
In honor of Wechsler, Kadish began his portion of the casebook with a 
section on “crime, morals, and personal liberty” that did not include a 
single case.157  Eschewing the common law, he immersed his first year 
students in the Model Penal Code, the Scottish Home Department’s 
“Report on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution,” Lord Justice Devlin’s 
lecture on “the Enforcement of Morals,” and an excerpt from H.L.A. 
Hart’s article “Immorality and Treason.”158   Knowing full well that 
“adultery, fornication, and prostitution” were all still offenses in the 
United States, Kadish pushed his students to consider whether such 
offenses should be eliminated.159  Regardless of the answer that individual 
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students arrived at – either morals offenses should be eliminated or not – 
the underlying lesson was clear: criminal law – and perhaps law generally 
– was neither immutable nor absolute.  It relied not on longstanding 
principles culled from common law cases, but policy considerations, 
statistical data, and academic studies.  Students, once required to kneel at 
the arcane oracle of the common law judge, were now asked to be 
legislators – and to come up with their own opinions of what the law 
should be. 
Even when Kadish did include cases, the basic mission of getting students 
to think like legislators did not change.  For example, to explain the 
distinction between first and second-degree murder, Kadish asked his 
students to read only one case from Utah where the common law judge 
lamented the fact that the distinction between first and second degree 
murder was meaningless.160  “It is true,” noted the judge, “that quite a 
number of courts” had approved jury instructions allowing jurors to find 
premeditation even though there was “no appreciable space of time 
between the intention to kill and the act of killing.”161  Convinced that this 
trend was bad, the judge nevertheless held that jurors should be allowed to 
find premeditation so long as the defendant developed a “fixed design or 
purpose” in a “space of time” no matter how “brief.”162  For students 
assigned to brief the case, the legal rule was both clear and ridiculous: 
some time should be allowed for the development of premeditation, yet no 
time was actually needed to premeditate a murder.  Rather than use the 
opinion to present one piece of a larger puzzle, like Perkins’s twenty-five 
cases on homicide, Kadish used one case to present the whole puzzle, then 
revealed it to be a travesty of justice. 
The approach won instant praise.  In a 1964 edition of the Harvard Law 
Review, Stanford University Law Professor Herbert L. Packer commended 
Kadish for assembling “the best conventional teaching book” in what was 
otherwise a “grimy” field of law usually reserved for the “most disfavored 
segment of the bar.”163  In particular, Packer praised Kadish’s beginning 
chapters on legislative choice, legality, and sentencing, all of which 
boasted “relatively little reliance on case material.”164  Rather than decry 
the absence of specific offenses like kidnapping, arson, and robbery, 
Packer rejoiced that “the dreary round of differential definitions” which 
formed the most “conspicuous feature” of many criminal law courses was 
gone, leaving professors obligated to only instruct their students in two 
crimes, homicide and theft.165  In a laudatory mood, Packer declared that 
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Paulsen and Kadish’s casebook represented the “only reasonable 
alternative” to Michael and Wechsler’s text “now available.”166
Packer’s review indicates that Michael and Wechsler’s text was still 
something of a benchmark by which other casebooks were judged even in 
the 1960s.  Though condescending in his attitude towards criminal 
practice, nothing new among law scholars, Packer clearly believed that 
Michael and Wechsler had elevated the subject’s intellectual status.  In 
fact, he even dated the “arrival” of “full intellectual respectability” to 
criminal law with the publication of their textbook in 1940, over twenty 
years earlier.167  Yet, Michael and Wechsler’s book had never gone 
through a second edition and sorely needed an overhaul.  For example, the 
text did not take into consideration the recent completion of the Model 
Penal Code in 1962 nor did it address the increasing criticism of morals 
offenses like adultery and fornication in the academic literature and press 
nationwide.168
Kadish and Paulsen addressed both subjects directly.  Not only did their 
first chapter focus on the policy behind punishing morals offenses, but 
they included substantial portions of the MPC commentaries in their 
text.169  This emphasis on the MPC carried through the entire substantive 
criminal law portion of the book, providing students with a timely 
counterpoint to common law doctrine.170  As the 1960s progressed, such a 
counterpoint to the common law proved more and more relevant as states 
began adopting portions of the MPC, including New York, which enlisted 
Herbert Wechsler himself to serve on a temporary commission to revise 
the state’s criminal law in 1961.171
By 1969, interest in the MPC and, by extension, Criminal Law & Its 
Processes was so high that Paulsen and Kadish put together a second 
edition.  In this version, they continued to use cases as pegs upon which to 
hang discussions of criminology, criminal law theory, and ethics.  For 
example, they included one case on narcotics possession to push students 
to consider whether users who suffer addiction should be punished.172
They also added material culled from the civil rights movement in the 
American South, including a case from South Carolina where the U.S. 
Supreme Court had declared that the state’s segregation statutes did not 
grant black sit-in demonstrators “fair warning” to stay out of white 
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restaurants.173  Given that Jim Crow had banned African Americans from 
white restaurants for fifty years, the ruling was hard to square with 
reality.174  Yet, by showing how the Supreme Court manipulated the law 
to protect black demonstrators, the case underscored law’s plasticity, 
pushing students to consider normative goals over interpretive rules.175
Though times had changed considerably since the 1930s, Kadish and 
Paulsen continued down Wechsler’s road in the 1960s away from the case 
method and towards a more open-ended inquiry into why the law existed 
as it did.  The advent of the Model Penal Code fueled this approach, as did 
the political climate of the 1960s.176  Questions of racial justice, police 
brutality, and the arbitrary definition of crime all became issues of real 
concern thanks to the civil rights movement in the South, urban riots in the 
North, and rising crime nationally.177  Yet, unlike the 1930s, the 1960s did 
not push criminal law scholars to develop a new approach to teaching so 
much as build on the approach that Wechsler and Michael had already 
devised.178
That approach continued to thrive through the end of the Twentieth 
Century.  From 1962 to 1975, Criminal Law & Its Processes went through 
three editions.179  By the turn-of the-century it had gone through six.180  In 
2007, it emerged in its eighth revised form, with Stephen J. Schulhofer 
and Carol S. Steiker replacing Monrad Paulsen.181 Processes even 
inspired disciples, most notably Joshua Dressler, who designated his own 
casebook, first published in 1994, a “son of Kadish.”182
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Even scholars who did not directly credit Wechsler or Kadish built on 
their basic model, providing students with a relatively small number of 
carefully selected cases along with a rich assortment of notes, questions, 
and outside sources.  In 1969, for example, Harvard professor Lloyd L. 
Weinreb published a casebook that separated criminal law from criminal 
procedure, a move that other authors would quickly make, but then 
retained the model developed by Wechsler and Kadish for his substantive 
criminal law portion.183  He began with three chapters on the general and 
special parts of criminal law, including a limited number of cases along 
with notes, commentary, newspaper excerpts, and law review citations, 
and then concluded with a Wechslerian chapter on “Crime and 
Punishment” that incorporated what one reviewer called an “unusual 
mélange” of materials.184  The materials included “quotations from 
classics in philosophy,” excerpts from sentencing reports, and portions of 
a debate between H.L.A. Hart, John Stuart Mill, and James Fitzjames 
Stephen.185  Though ordered differently than Kadish’s introductory 
chapters, Weinreb’s inclusion of outside sources as well as philosophical 
and criminological materials nevertheless represented an obvious variation 
of Wechsler’s approach.  Wienreb himself explained that he wanted his 
students to consider the “moral, political, and social issues” surrounding 
criminal law, not just the rules.186
Four years later, in 1973, George E. Dix and M. Michael Sharlot, both of 
the University of Texas, continued the Wechslerian tradition with 
Criminal Law: Cases and Materials, which began with an excerpt from 
“The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society” a report on rising crime rates 
put together by Lyndon Johnson’s special commission on law enforcement 
and criminal justice.187  The text continued with sections on the 
criminalization of alcohol intoxication, pulling together excerpts from 
scholarly treatises, statistical studies, and “criminal histories of 
alcoholics.”188  Throughout, the casebook aimed to be “more than a 
vehicle” for students to learn “the law of crimes,” shooting instead to 
“facilitate inquiry” into the “broadest issues” of the “relationship of the 
individual to the state.”189
Without describing each subsequent casebook to emerge since 1973, 
suffice it to say that no new approaches to teaching criminal law arose in 
the Twentieth Century.190  Though different authors stressed different 
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areas, the general method remained the same.191  Cases remained central, 
but were fewer in number and more heavily supplemented by outside 
materials than during Beale’s time.192  Normative questions also 
frequently followed cases, pushing students to think critically about why 
the law was as it was, and whether it should be changed.193
So far, Wechsler’s model has survived into the Twenty-First Century, with 
perhaps one exception.194  Paul Robinson, on the faculty at Pennsylvania, 
substantially altered the casebook format in 2005 by beginning each 
section with a crime scenario followed by extensive statutory materials 
and only brief case excerpts.195  Following each scenario, Robinson asked 
students to behave as practitioners and determine “what liability, if any” 
existed under the prevailing law.196  At first glance, this method marks an 
interesting turn towards a more practitioner-oriented approach, one that 
pushes students to evaluate facts as if they were prosecutors.  Yet, even 
Robinson includes a Wechslerian twist.  After each problem, he locates a 
“discussion materials” section that includes excerpts from law reviews, 
academic studies and so on, providing law teachers with the option of 
finishing topics on a normative, policy-oriented note.197  Assuming that 
discussion sections are assigned, Robinson’s text is the least case-friendly 
to have been compiled yet, marking in certain ways the culmination of 
Wechsler’s revolt against the case method.198
This raises a question of cause and effect.  While it is undoubtedly true 
that Wechsler viewed the addition of non-case materials to be a rebellion 
against the case method in the 1930s, could the same be said of scholars 
who came after him?199  Is it not possible that they might have moved 
away from the method on their own, independent of Wechsler’s influence?  
Perhaps: even if Wechsler had never joined Jerome Michael in the 
compilation of a criminal law casebook in 1940, for example, the 
completion of the Model Penal Code in 1962, which Wechsler directed, 
essentially transformed the field so dramatically that even the most 
unreconstructed adherents to Langdell’s method, Rollin Perkins being 
perhaps the best example, ultimately had to concede the “dominance” of 
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194
 Twenty-first century casebooks tend to be improvements on Wechsler rather than 
digressions from.  See e.g. DUBBER & KELMAN, supra note 6 and LEE & HARRIS, supra
note 6.  
195
 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES & CONTROVERSIES (1st ed. 2005).  
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199
 For example, Sanford Kadish later recalled that even though his casebook was a direct 
“descendant” of Wechsler’s, he himself was not “burning with some reformist zeal” 
when he wrote it.  Interview with Sanford H. Kadish, supra note 6. 
 28
statutory materials to the study of criminal law by the end of the 
century.200
Yet, just because statutes became a bigger part of the criminal law does 
not mean that casebooks necessarily had to follow Wechsler’s model to 
the extent that they did.  For example, it could have been possible for 
scholars to do what Paul Robinson has done, namely include statutory 
materials side by side with cases, without any additional discussion 
section pushing students to reflect on why the law says what it does.  One 
thing that Wechsler contributed to the field was a particular “perspective,” 
to borrow from Kadish, not so much of a lawyer but a type of hypothetical 
legislator, interested in both normative and intellectual questions of ethics, 
science, sociology, and politics.201
V. CONCLUSION
While most criminal law scholars would probably not attribute the 
structure of their casebooks to Herbert Wechsler, they could.  Beginning 
in the 1930s, Wechsler intentionally transformed the manner in which 
criminal law casebooks were organized, reducing cases in favor of 
supplementary materials culled from philosophy, criminology, and other 
disciplines.  The result not only proved popular, but helped elevate the 
status of a course that many scorned for being associated with a 
professionally undesirable, disreputable field.  By the 1960s, Wechsler’s 
model had become the dominant format for criminal law casebooks, and 
criminal law courses, in the United States. 
That dominance continues today.  Precisely for this reason, it is worth 
recovering the history behind why Wechsler organized his course in the 
way that he did.  For example, much of Wechsler’s innovation was made 
possible by the fact that elite law schools like Columbia were not 
interested in training criminal lawyers.  This freed Wechsler to innovate in 
a way that professors who taught contracts, property, and commercial law 
could not.202  It also transformed the mission of the course, if you will, 
nudging it away from practical training to policy considerations and 
ethics.  While Columbia initially thought that this would better train 
administrative attorneys and policy analysts for Roosevelt’s New Deal, 
Wechsler’s innovation proved permanent.  Two decades after the 
publication of his casebook in 1940, Wechsler’s approach was fast 
defining the field, transforming criminal law from a skills course to what 
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Sanford Kadish remembers as an attempt to produce “good, sensitive, 
aware, socially conscious,” citizens.203
That law schools should strive to produce better citizens is hard to refute.  
However, the Carnegie Foundation’s recent recommendation that law 
school education return to an emphasis on legal practice raises questions 
about the possible tension between skills and ethics.204  For example, do 
law schools still view criminal practice to be undesirable?  If so, then 
perhaps Wechsler’s innovations should remain in place, regardless of the 
Carnegie report.  Then again, what if schools decide to get more serious 
about training criminal law practitioners?  Do they not sacrifice some 
amount of practical training by pursuing Wechsler’s approach?  What 
good are ethics, philosophy, and sociology if graduating students do not 
know the law? 
Of course, scholars might argue that Wechsler’s approach is unavoidable 
given the dramatic rise in codification over the course of the past four 
decades.  Yet, even a brief glimpse at the history of the criminal law 
course suggests that codification was not what inspired Wechsler to 
change his approach.  He rejected the case method for political reasons, 
blaming the method for inculcating a narrow view of the law that 
contributed to the Supreme Court’s destruction of the first New Deal.  
This explains why he moved towards normative questions in his notes.  He 
did not simply want students to be able to analyze and interpret statutes; 
he wanted them to question the law, and to recognize its relationship to 
society.  If Wechsler had not felt anger at the case method, it is entirely 
possible that a criminal law textbook would have evolved, like Robinson’s 
evolved, which merged statutes and cases in a problem-oriented fashion. 
Recovering the political motivations behind Wechsler’s anti-case 
method raises questions about the political implications of legal education 
generally.  To take just one example, Duncan Kennedy’s now legendary 
attack on legal education as a “reproduction of hierarchy” fails to 
recognize that Wechsler and Michael’s approach to criminal law sought to 
reproduce a very different type of hierarchy than the one Langdell had 
originally intended in 1870.205  Rather than engender a reverence for 
judicial precedent and the private ordering of economic affairs, as 
Langdell had sought, Wechsler and Michael aimed to instill a respect for 
public ordering and governmental intervention in private matters, in line 
with Roosevelt’s statist New Deal.206  The success of their approach, 
which coincided with realist calls for reform at Yale in the 1930s, hints at 
a larger thesis: not only did the New Deal usher in the decline of Lochner-
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era jurisprudence, but it hastened the demise of Lochner-era lawyers.207
Out of our nation’s greatest economic crisis came a push to create a new 
kind of attorney, one who believed that society’s most pressing problems 
were best solved by public, not private law.208
Even if Wechsler and Michael’s antipathy to private law did not 
transform the American lawyer, criminal law remains the only first year 
course to represent an open revolt against the case method.  This means 
that at a basic pedagogical level, criminal law does not necessarily teach 
the things that the method teaches, including legal reasoning, deductive 
analysis, or how to think like a lawyer.  In fact, criminal law might be 
teaching students how not to think like lawyers.  This, after all, was 
Wechsler’s intention.  Lawyers, in his opinion, had blindly endorsed legal 
fictions like substantive due process and liberty of contract at the expense 
of the nation, driving it to economic ruin.  What needed to happen, in his 
opinion, was an explosion of this “closed-system,” in favor of a much 
more critical mode of analysis.209
Whether law schools should be in the business of teaching such 
analysis is worth reconsidering, if for no other reason than to justify 
current practice in the face of mounting doubt.  For example, one could 
easily read the Carnegie Report and argue that the battles that Wechsler 
was fighting in the 1930s are over.  No longer do common law courses 
dominate law school.  Administrative law, contracts, commercial 
transactions, and tax all push students to deal with statutory materials as 
well as judicial opinions.  Further, the Model Penal Code is not only an 
established part of the criminal law in most states, but it is over half a 
century old and has begun to produce its own body of common law 
interpreting it.  Though it may be too early to say that we have entered a 
new common law era, it is certainly true that the MPC has taken on a life 
of its own as states have adopted portions of it and modified others to meet 
particularized, local needs.  Are students who have undergone Wechsler’s 
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method prepared to deal with those needs?  Can they perform the kind of 
case analysis that is currently needed to find legal answers?  And can law 
schools, particularly regional schools, continue to afford to adopt the elite 
mentality that criminal law is not a worthy profession? 
While such questions may not strike criminal law teachers as particularly 
important, recovering Wechsler’s revolt against Langdell sheds light on 
how at least one law school course moved away from a practitioner’s 
perspective.  Recovering this process for other courses may be the next 
step towards explaining why the Carnegie Foundation discovered the 
problems that it did, setting the stage for more widespread curricular 
reform.  Or, recovering Wechsler may do something else entirely: it may 
help law school administrators counter the Carnegie findings with a larger 
vision of what legal education, ultimately, should be about. 
